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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol, whose security analysis does
not rely on any assumption on the detection system, can immune the attacking against detectors. We
give a first composable security analysis for continuous-variable measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution using squeezed states against general coherent attacks. The security
analysis is derived based on the entanglement-based scheme considering finite size effect. A version
of entropic uncertainty relation is exploited to give a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-
entropy by trusting Alice’s and Bob’s devices. The simulation results indicate that, in the universal
composable security framework, the protocol can tolerate 2.5 dB and 6.5 dB channel loss against
coherent attacks with direct and reverse reconciliation, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2], which is an
indispensable part of today’s quantum cryptography, al-
lows two legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to distribute
keys secretly thanks to quantum physics. The most
attractive property of QKD may be the information-
theoretic security against any potential attacks. Broadly
speaking, QKD has two main approaches: one is discrete-
variable (DV) QKD, and the alternative is continuous-
variable (CV) QKD [3–5]. Compared to DV-QKD pro-
tocols, CV-QKD protocols are based on variants of homo-
dyne detection which is “off-the-shelf” [6–8], and can per-
form high secret key rates for metropolitan range. Vari-
ous novel CV-QKD protocols were proposed recent years,
including two-way quantum cryptographic protocol [9–
14], single-quadrature protocols [15, 16], floodlight QKD
protocol [17–19] and so forth, which enrich the field of
CV-QKD. A new CV protocol design framework has been
proposed to design protocols according to user’s needs
[20], which can be achieved by arbitrary non-orthogonal
states. Experiments [21–26], especially field tests [27]
for distributing secret keys over long distances are cur-
rently achievable, making CV protocols competitive with
respect to their DV counterparts.
The security-proof toolbox of CV-QKD has been en-
riched over the past few years, such as de Finetti theo-
rem [28, 29], postselection technique [30, 31], the entropic
uncertainty relations [32–34] and so forth. Many pro-
tocols show their security against collective attacks via
a Gaussian optimality arguement [35–38] but are only
considered in the asymptotic limit. Fortunately, those
security-proof tools make it possible to generalize the
security analysis to the most general coherent attacks
even considering finite-size effect. For instance, under
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Gaussian modulation, the coherent state protocol with
heterodyne detection was proved secure against coherent
attacks with the help of rotation invariance [28], and the
squeezed state [39] protocol with homodyne detection is
secure using entropic uncertainty relations [32].
Apart from theoretical security analysis, practical se-
curity analysis in QKD is gradually paid attentions to
take the gap between theory and practice into consid-
eration. Measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
protocol is a genius idea to immune the attacking against
detectors [40–45] , moving towards practical security of
QKD. CV-MDI QKD, as one of the candidate protocol
to achieve multipartite communication [46–49], has been
shown to against collective attacks and some work also
take finite-size effect into account [50–52]. Recently, the
composable security analysis of CV-MDI QKD, which
could be applied both to coherent-state protocols and
to entangled-state protocols, has been proposed to de-
fend general coherent attacks via Gaussian de Finetti re-
duction [53], while the composable security analysis of
that using squeezed states under coherent attacks has
not been discussed yet.
It should note that the entropic uncertainty relations
are paid a lot of attentions in both DV-QKD and CV-
QKD’s security proofs [54, 55]. There is a large family of
entropic uncertainty relation, among which the infinite
dimensional state-independent entropic uncertainty rela-
tion with quantum memories was studied in depth [56]
and it was soon applied for the security proof of squeezed-
state protocol with homodyne detection [32–34]. The
entropic uncertainty method can be exploited to prove
the security of squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol
directly.
In this paper, we use the similar method as Ref. [32]
did to the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol by
trusting Alice’s and Bob’s devices, and show the perfor-
mance against general coherent attacks, which is based
on an state-independent entropic uncertainty relation
with quantum side information for smooth entropies.
2Meanwhile, the analysis not only considers the finite-size
effect, but also takes some necessary steps into account,
such as channel parameter estimation and error correc-
tion, so that the final secret key length has to be reduced
due to the fact that those estimation phases inevitably
consume amount of keys. Moreover, we analyze both
direct and reverse reconciliation scenarios. Focusing on
the extremely asymmetric cases, where Bob is placed on
the Charlie’s side, the ideal case (modulation variance
tending to infinity) and a practical feasible parameters
case (modulation variance as small as 5.04, referring to
10 dB squeezing [57], with imperfect reconciliation effi-
ciency β = 96.9% [58]) are both discussed at different
block lengths. More general cases are also discussed in
the appendix.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II A, a short
review on the definition of composable security in QKD is
described. In Sec. II B, we provide a detailed description
of the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol against
general coherent attacks under the entanglement-based
scheme. In Sec. II C, we introduce a version of state-
independent entropy uncertainty relation conditional on
quantum side-information into the security analyse of the
protocol and derive the secure key rate against coherent
attacks. Then, in Sec. III, we give out the simulation re-
sults of the secret key rate in both direct and reverse rec-
onciliation cases, especially under extremely asymmetric
scenarios. Finally, a summary of the paper is given in
Sec. IV.
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY
ANALYSIS
In this section, a brief introduction about the definition
of composable security in QKD is given, and the details
can be found in Ref. [59, 60]. Then the CV-MDI QKD
protocol using squeezed states against coherent attacks is
described in detail, followed by the entropic uncertainty
relation to obtain the secret key rate of the protocol.
A. Composable security definition
Roughly speaking, a protocol can be called ‘security’,
which should satisfy three criteria called ‘robustness’,
‘correctness’ and ‘secrecy’. If the probability of produc-
ing empty set of secret key is not higher than εrob when
eavesdropper is inactive, a protocol is called εrob-robust.
A QKD protocol can be called ‘correct’, if Alice and
Bob can get the same keys for any initial quantum state
ΨABE (no matter what strategy of the adversary may be
used to the quantum state). The secret key is denoted by
SA and SB after they finish the protocol, and a protocol is
called εcor-correct if the probability of producing different
sets of secret key between SA and SB is not higher than
εcor, i.e., Pr [SA 6= SB] ≤ εcor.
A final key is ∆-secret if it is ∆-close to a uniformly
distributed key that is unpredictable for the adversary.
Here ∆ quantifies the distance between a practical key
and an ideal one, for a ∆-secret protocol, which should
satisfy
1
2
‖ρSASBE′ − ωl ⊗ ρE′‖1 ≤ ∆, (1)
where ρSASBE′ is the practical state mixing Alice, Bob
and the potential adversary Eve’s strings SA, SB and
E′, and ωl is the fully mixed state on classical strings
of length l. ωl ⊗ ρE′ shows the ideal classical-quantum
state is separable. Hence if ∆ = 0 for any Eve’s at-
tack strategies, a QKD protocol can be called secret.
Moreover, a protocol is called εsec-secret, if it is εsec-
indistinguishable from a ideal secret protocol. In par-
ticular, a protocol is εsec-secret, if it outputs ∆-secure
keys with (1− pabort)∆ ≤ εsec, where pabort is the prob-
ability that the protocol aborts. εrob, εcor and εsec are
parameters to qualify robustness, correctness and secrecy
respectively and they will affect the final rate of secret
key.
A QKD protocol is called secure if it satisfies both
correct and secret. It is called ε-secure if it is ε-
indistinguishable from a secure protocol. In particular,
a protocol is ε-secure, if it is εcor-correct and εsec-secret
with εcor + εsec ≤ ε.
B. CV-MDI QKD using squeezed states against
coherent attacks
In this subsection, we describe the squeezed-state CV
MDI QKD protocol for which we prove composable se-
curity against coherent attacks based on the entropic un-
certainty relation. Here we focus on the entanglement-
based (EB) model of the protocol [61] instead of the the
prepare & measure (PM) version, for the former scheme
is often used in the security analysis of QKD, while the
later is easy to implement, and once the security of the
EB scheme is proved, the security of the PM version is
easily obtained because of the equivalence between two
schemes [42]. The EB scheme of the squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol (Fig. 1) is described as follows:
1. State Preparation: Alice and Bob prepare 2N
two-mode squeezed vacuum states EPR1 and EPR2
with variances VA and VB, respectively. They keep
mode A1 and B1 on each side and then send the
other modes A2 and B2 to the untrusted third party
(Charlie) through two insecure quantum channels, i.e.
channelAC and channelBC ;
2. Bell Measurement: Charlie applies Bell detection
of the received quantum states. Modes A′ and B′ are
combined with a balanced beam splitter with output
C andD, and afterwards, x-quadrature of mode C and
p-quadrature of mode D are measured with homodyne
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FIG. 1. (Color online) EB scheme of the squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol. EPR: two-mode squeezed state. Hom:
homodyne detection. Hom1x: homodyne detection of mea-
suring the x-quadrature. Hom2p: homodyne detection of
measuring the p-quadrature. XC (PD): measurement re-
sults of Hom1x (Hom2p). BS: 50:50 balanced beam splitter.
ChannelAC (ChannelBC): totally untrusted quantum chan-
nel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie controlled by adversary.
Public channel: authenticated channel using for classical com-
munication.
detectors. The results of joint measurement xC and
pD are announced to Alice and Bob through public
classical channel;
3. Displacement: After receiving Charlie’s measure-
ment results {xC , pD}, Bob apply local displacement
operations D (β) on mode B1 to get mode B1
′, where
β = g (xC + pD) and g is the gain of this operation
related to the total channel loss;
4. Measurement: Alice and Bob measure the 2N
modes using homodyne detection which randomly de-
tect the x-quadrature or p-quadrature and the mea-
surement outcomes are discretized with the finite
range analogue-to-digital converter (ADC). For every
two modes A1 and B1
′, Alice gets the data {XA (PA)}
and Bob gets the data {XB (PB)} respectively;
5. Sifting: Both of two communication parties announce
which quadrature they choose through an authentic
pubic channel. They hold the data which the selected
quadratures are the same and discard the rest. The
length of effective data after this step reduces to about
N in each party.
6. Channel Parameter Estimation: Once Alice and
Bob have collected sufficient correlated data, they use
the public channel to perform parameter estimation to
check the correlation between their data. The two par-
ties randomly choose a common subset of length kpe
from the sifted data and estimate the average distance
between their samples:
d (XpeA , X
pe
B ) =
1
kpe
∑kpe
i=1
∣∣∣XpeA,i −XpeB,i∣∣∣, (2)
where XpeA =
(
XpeA,i
)kpe
i=1
and XpeB =
(
XpeB,i
)kpe
i=1
. If
d (XpeA , X
pe
B ) is smaller than a certain parameter d0,
they proceed and otherwise, the protocol aborts. The
parameter d0 is the distance between the measurement
results of Alice and Bob, which should be chosen small
enough to ensure the data are correlated enough. Data
XpeA and X
pe
B are also used to estimate the amount of
information needed in Error correction step;
7. Error Correction: Alice sends some information to
Bob and Bob corrects the errors in his data using er-
ror reconciliation algorithm (direct reconciliation), or
Alice corrects the errors in her data with the help of
Bob’s sending information (reverse reconciliation). It
may cost length of ℓEC secret keys during error correc-
tion phase. After that, two parties do the hash check
[28], i.e. they expend the length of kcheck extra data
to check if both hashes coincide. If this check passes,
the protocol resumes, otherwise it aborts;
8. Calculation of Secret Key Length: Alice and Bob
calculate the secret key length ℓ according to the pre-
sented secret key length formula and entropic uncer-
tainty relation which will be shown in Sec. II C. If the
secret key length is negative, they abort the protocol;
9. Privacy Amplification: Both of two communication
parties apply a hash function [62] on their corrected
strings respectively to generate the secret key of length
ℓ.
C. Uncertainty relation and secret key rate
In previous researches of CV-QKD, in general, a practi-
cal homodyne detector is modeled as an ideal homodyne
detector and an ADC with finite range [28]. To illus-
trate the measurement phase in our protocol more clearly,
without loss of generality, we model the homodyne detec-
tor as an ideal homodyne detector followed by an ADC
with finite range and divide the measurement process
into two steps. First, Alice and Bob use ideal homodyne
detectors to measure the quadratures of the states that
they received (ρA1 and ρB1′ in Fig. 1). The outputs of
ideal homodyne detectors ({QA, PA}, {QB, PB}) in two
sides are ideal continuous variables with infinite range,
4and the statistical distribution of each outcome should
generally follow a Gaussian distribution.
It is important for the protocol to have high correla-
tions between two parties’ outcomes. However, due to
the channel losses, the quadratures x and p at Alice and
Bob sides ({QA, PA},{QB, PB}) will decay. In order to
handle that, the quadrature measurements in one of two
parties {QA, PA} or {QB, PB} needs to be rescaled before
grouping into the intervals. We use the transformations
below (using Alice as an example):
QA → Q˜A = tqQA, PA → P˜A = tpPA, (3)
where tq and tp denote the rescaling factors related to the
channel loss of ChannelAC and ChannelBC (see Appendix
A about the estimation). After that, the data between
Alice and Bob should be correlated enough.
In step 2, Alice and Bob use ADCs with finite sampling
range and finite resolution, to discretize the continuous
quadratures
{
Q˜A, P˜A
}
and {QB, PB} into different in-
tervals: (−∞,−α], (−α,−α+ δ], ...., (α,∞). Here, α is
the maximum discretization range of ADC, which takes
the finite range of detectors into consideration in the se-
curity proof, and δ denotes the precision of the measure-
ment. The corresponding outcome alphabet is denoted
by χ = {1, 2, ..., 2α/δ}, where we assume 2α/δ ∈ N and
every measurement outcome corresponds to one of the
intervals. Therefore, the data {XA, PA} in Alice side
is obtained by discreting the quadrature measurements{
Q˜A, P˜A
}
, likewise the data in Bob.
It should note that practical homodyne detection may
lead to security problems since its outputs lack informa-
tion of the quadratures. For instance, in equal-length in-
tervals (−α,−α+ δ], ...., (α− δ, α], owning to the finite
sampling bits, any measurement outcomes inside of one
sampling interval will map to the same value and it may
cause lacking of the details about the state within each
sampling interval, for one cannot determine whether the
distribution of measured states is Gaussian distribution
or other non-Gaussian distribution. Moreover, we as-
sume that any information in another two infinite-length
intervals (−∞,−α] and [α,∞) will also map to one value
as a result of the finite sampling range property of ADC,
e.g. one cannot distinguish whether the measured pulse is
low energy pulse or high energy pulse, which makes the
measurement outcomes short of the information about
the state outside the range. Those imperfect feature of
detection may open the loophole to potential Eve and a
number of attacks, such as large energy attack, may be
exploited to reduce the security of the protocol. There
are in general two approaches to handle that problem.
One is using the method as Ref. [32] did by trusting Al-
ice’s and Bob’s devices, and another solution is adding
the energy test to provide detailed information about
measured states (as Ref. [33] did) to replace the trusted
source assumption. This paper follows the former so-
lution and assume that Alice and Bob produce trusted
states with quadratures being larger than α with very
small probability pα.
After the measurement step is done, the physical steps
of the protocol are finished, and the rest of the protocol is
treated as the post-processing part aiming at extracting
secure keys from the raw keys. Due to the leftover hash
lemma, the εc-correct and εs-secret key of length ℓ can
be extracted [63], which satisfies
ℓ ≤ Hεmin(XA|E)ω − ℓEC −O
(
log
1
εsεc
)
, (4)
where ℓEC denotes the leakage information in error cor-
rection phase, and Hεmin (·) is the smooth min-entropy
with smoothing parameter ε. Hεmin (XA|E) is the smooth
conditional min-entropy of data XA conditioned on the
information Eve may have, which quantifies Eve’s uncer-
tainty about the Alice’s measurement outcomes. In the
coherent attacks cases, the goal is to bound the smooth
min-entropy Hεmin (XA|E) conditioned on the event that
the protocol does not abort. Different from the param-
eter estimation method in Ref. [53], the smooth min-
entropy Hεmin (XA|E) can be estimated with the help of
the entropic uncertainty relation conditioned on side in-
formation with infinite dimensional quantum memories
[32] in our paper.
Entropic uncertainty relations are used in some se-
curity proofs of QKD protocols giving its power to de-
scribe the bounds of guessing uncertainty Eve may have,
when both Alice and Bob perform measurements in two
random bases in a certain tripartite quantum system.
There is a large family of entropy uncertainty relations
with both infinite-dimensional and finite-spacing formu-
las [55]. However, a more operational way to express
uncertainty is in terms of the discrete Shannon entropy
rather than differential relations, so we follow above to
calculate the secret key length with discrete Shannon en-
tropy’s version of uncertainty relation, and quantum side
information is considered with smooth min- and max-
entropies.
The scenario of uncertainty relations can be under-
stood as follows: The tripartite state ωABE with Al-
ice, Bob and Eve hold infinite dimensional quantum sys-
tems A, B and E respectively. Alice randomly measures
quadrature x or p on state ωA = TrBE [ωABE ] in each
run and stores the outcomes in one of two classical sys-
tems. The same operation is done at Bob side acting at
ωB = TrAE [ωABE]. The outcome strings are denoted by
{XA, PA} and {XB, PB} respectively. After sifting, two
pairs of random strings {XA, XB} and {PA, PB} should
obey the uncertainty principle and Eve cannot predict
Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes precisely. Hence
the relation between smooth min- and max- entropies
satisfies
Hεmin(XA|E)ω ≥ n log
1
c (δ)
−Hε′max(XA|XB)ω. (5)
5Here we assume the random selection is identically
and independently distributed. The term c (δ) is
the ‘incompatibility’ of the measurement operators and
Hε
′
max(XA|XB)ω is the smooth max-entropy between the
data of Alice and Bob with smoothing parameter ε′,
which reads
ε′ = εs
/
(4ppass)− 2f (pα, n)
/√
ppass. (6)
with f (pα, n) =
√
2 (1− (1− pα)n) [64], which is the
function considering about the probability of the event
in outside of the detection range [−α, α]. c (δ) takes the
measurement discretization into consideration, which is
c (δ) =
1
2π
δ2 · S(1)0
(
1,
δ2
4
)2
, (7)
where S
(1)
0 denotes the 0
th radial prolate spheroidal wave
function of the first kind [65]. c (δ) can be well approx-
imated with c (δ) ≈ δ2/(2π) when the length of interval
δ is small. For a certain value of δ, c (δ) is a constant
either, so the value of smooth min-entropy Hεmin (XA|E)
can be estimated by upper bounding the smooth max-
entropy Hε
′
max (XA|XB) between random strings XA and
XB.
To estimate the upper bound of Hε
′
max (XA|XB), the
correlation of the data between Alice and Bob needs to
be qualify first. Alice and Bob randomly choose a subset
χkpe with string length kpe to calculate the average dis-
tance d (XpeA , X
pe
B ) between their data X
pe
A and X
pe
B in
parameter estimation step, where pe stand for parameter
estimation. If d (XpeA , X
pe
B ) < d0, the ε
′-smooth max-
entropy can be bounded by
Hε
′
max (XA|XB) ≤ n log γ (d (XA, XB)) , (8)
where γ is a function arising from a large deviation con-
sideration, which reads
γ (t) =
(
t+
√
t2 + 1
) [
t
/(√
t2 + 1− 1
)]t
. (9)
Using sampling theory, the quantity d (XA, XB) can
be estimated by d (XpeA , X
pe
B ) plus a correction µ with
high probability. µ quantifies its deviation to d (XA, XB)
considering about the finite-size statistical fluctuation.
Finally, the ℓ length secret key can be extracted from the
remaining data XA, XB ∈ χn with the length of n, which
is written as
ℓ = n
[
log
1
c (δ)
− log γ (d0 + µ)
]
−ℓEC− log 1
ε2sεc
, (10)
and
µ =
2α
δ
√
N (kpe + 1)
nk2pe
ln
1
ε′
. (11)
Here the remaining data has a length n = N − kpe −
kcheck approximately, for some raw keys were cut off from
the test steps above.
There are two main elements of Eq. (10), one is the
estimation of smooth min-entropy Hεmin (XA|E), and the
other is the leakage information ℓEC during error correc-
tion. The former, as mentioned above, can be estimated
by the date XpeA and X
pe
B , which is independent to the
reconciliation methods [66], while the later is determined
by the information reconciliation, hence Eq. (10) can be
exploited to calculate secret key rate in both direct and
reverse reconciliation cases.
For the direct reconciliation case, the leakage informa-
tion in error correction step reads
ℓDREC = H (XA)− βI (XB : XA) , (12)
and in reverse reconciliation case it reads
ℓRREC = H (XB)− βI (XB : XA) , (13)
where H (XA) and H (XB) denote the discrete Shannon
entropies, and I (XB : XA) is the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND
DISCUSSION
In this section, we focus on the simulation results of
the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol in the ideal
detection case against coherent attacks. Section II C il-
lustrates that the simulation of secret key rate in our pro-
tocol can be divided into two parts, one is the estimation
of smooth min-entropy Hεmin (XA|E) considering finite-
size effect, the other is the leakage information ℓEC in
error correction, which could be calculated with the help
of the covariance matrix. Only the extremely asymmet-
ric cases are discussed here as the examples, where Bob is
located at Charlie’s side (TBC = 0), for the transmission
distance can reach the maximum [43]. The discussion of
symmetric cases can be seen in Appendix D considering
more general attack strategy.
Considering the EB version of the squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol (Fig. 1), the covariance matrix can
be estimated by Alice and Bob’s data directly in exper-
iment, and here, without loss of generality, we assume
that channelsAC and channelsBC are under two indepen-
dent entangling cloner attacks to estimate the covariance
matrix. We should point out that Eve’s attack described
here is not the optimal one [44, 67]. The entangling cloner
6attack is usually used to model a Gaussian channel af-
fected by the environment and is analyzed to get a sense
of a protocol’s performance in experiment [43], and in
experiment, we can calculate the amount of information
used in error correction phase in parameter estimation
step without assuming which attack Eve may use. More-
over, the estimation of leakage information does affect
the final secret key rate, but not induce statistical fluc-
tuation introduced by parameter estimation step, and all
the statistical fluctuation introduced by parameter es-
timation has been considered in the estimation of max-
entropy. Detailed derivation of the covariance matrix can
be see in Appendix B. First, Alice and Bob generate two-
mode squeezed state ρA1A2 and ρB1B2 respectively. The
covariance matrixes γA1A2 and γB1B2 read
γA1A2 =
(
VAI2
√
V 2A − 1σz√
V 2A − 1σz VAI2
)
, (14)
γB1B2 =
(
VBI2
√
V 2B − 1σz√
V 2B − 1σz VBI2
)
, (15)
where I2 is the identity matrix, VA(B) stand for the vari-
ance of Alice (Bob)’s two-mode squeezed state from Eve’s
view and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
Before Charlie applies Bell measurement to mode C
and mode D, the whole state ρA1CDB1 can be described
by a 8×8 covariance matrix γA1CDB1 . Then mode A′ and
B′ received by Charlie interfere at a beam splitter (BS)
with two output C and D modes measured by homodyne
detections respectively. The measurement results xC and
pD are announced by Charlie in a public channel so that
Bob can displace mode B1 to B
′
1. It is easy to get the
covariance matrix γA1B1′ of the state ρA1B1′ shared by
Alice and Bob, which reads
γA1B1′ =
(
VAI2
√
T (V 2A − 1)σz√
T (V 2A − 1)σz [T (VA − 1) + 1 + Te] I2
)
,
(16)
where
T =
T1
2
g2. (17)
T stands for the equivalent channel transmittance be-
tween Alice and Bob, T1 is the channel transmittance
between Alice and Charlie, and g is the gain of displace-
ment. The equivalent excess noise e is given by
e = 1 +
1
T1
[2 + T2 (ε2 − 2) + T1 (ε1 − 1)]
+
1
T1
(√
2
g
√
VB − 1−
√
T2
√
VB + 1
)2
. (18)
In the numerical simulation, one can select g =√
2
T2
√
VB−1
VB+1
so that the equivalent excess noise e is op-
timal [42]. Therefore, we can get
e = ε1 +
1
T1
[T2 (ε2 − 2) + 2] . (19)
Accordingly, the discrete Shannon entropies H (XA)
and H (XB) have the following forms when δ is small
(see Appendix C about the detailed derivation):
H (XA) ≈ log
(√
2πeVA
)
− log (δ) , (20)
and
H (XB) ≈ log
(√
2πeVB
′
)
− log (δ) , (21)
where VB
′ = T (VA − 1)+1+Te. The mutual information
between Alice and Bob can be well approximated, which
reads
I (XA : XB) ≈ 1
2
log
(
VA + χ
χ+ 1
VA
)
, (22)
where χ = 1
T
− 1+ e. Once we have obtained the form of
covariance matrix in the EB model, with the help of Eq.
(10), the secret key rate against coherent attack in both
direct reconciliation and reverse reconciliation cases can
be calculated.
A. Direct reconciliation protocol
First, numerical simulations of the secret-key rate in
the direct reconciliation cases are performed. The perfor-
mance of the extremely asymmetric structure with ideal
modulation variances
(
Va = Vb = 10
5
)
is given in Fig. 2.
The perfect reconciliation efficiency (β = 1) is set to get
the optimal performance of this protocol against coher-
ent attacks. The interval parameter is set to α = 52 [32],
the discretization parameter d = 13, the excess noises
ε1 = ε2 = 0.002, and the overall security parameter is
smaller than 10−20. The block length of information rec-
onciliation kpe can be optimized in experiment. If kpe is
too large, the final key rate may decrease due to a small
quantity of raw key using for generating secret keys. On
the contrary, one may not get accurate estimation of the
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Secret key rates of squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol against coherent attack in the extremely
asymmetric cases (TBC = 0) with direct reconciliation in the
frame of composable security. Those lines are under the ideal
conditions with ideal modulation variances VA = VB = 10
5
and perfect reconciliation efficiency β = 1. The block lengths
from left to right curves show N = 1010 (green dot-dashed
line), 1011 (blue dot line), 1012 (red dashed line) and∞ (black
solid line), respectively. Here the discretization parameter is
set to d = 13, the excess noise ε1 = ε2 = 0.002, and the
overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Secret key rates of squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol against coherent attack in the extremely
asymmetric cases (TBC = 0) with direct reconciliation. The
protocol with practical modulation variances VA = VB = 5.04
and imperfect reconciliation efficiency β = 96.9% is consid-
ered. The block lengths from left to right curves are N = 1010
(green dot-dashed line), 1011 (blue dot line), 1012 (red dashed
line) and ∞ (black solid line), respectively. The discretization
parameter, excess noises, and security parameters are chosen
as in the case of ideal modulation.
channel parameters if kpe is too small. In this simula-
tion, we choose the block length of information reconcil-
iation about 1/10 of the total length, i.e. kpe = N/10.
It can be seen that, when the block length is infinite-
size (N = ∞), the protocol reach the longest transmis-
sion distance, with a corresponding channel loss of about
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Secret key rates vs block size for the ex-
tremely asymmetric case (TBC = 0) with direct reconciliation.
The solid lines are under the ideal condition where modulation
variances VA = VB = 10
5 and perfect reconciliation efficiency
β = 1. The dot-dashed lines are under the practical condition
where practical modulation variances VA = VB = 5.04 and
imperfect reconciliation efficiency β = 96.9%. From left to
right, the transmittance of the quantum channel corresponds
to loss of 0.2 dB (black line), 0.4 dB (red line), and 0.5 dB
(green line), respectively.
2.5 dB. In N = 1012 case, the protocol is closed to the
asymptotic rate.
The realistic performance is described under the con-
dition that the practical variances are VA = VB = 5.04
(referring to 10 dB squeezing) and imperfect reconcili-
ation efficiency is set to η = 96.9%. The key rate of a
realistic extremely asymmetric case of the CV-MDI QKD
protocol is described in Fig. 3. We plot the key rate as
a function of the channel loss TAC , while the channel
loss TBC is set to 0 dB, with different block lengths of
1010, 1011, 1012 and infinite-size. For the asymptotic case
N → ∞, the maximum tolerable channel loss can reach
approximately 0.64 dB (black solid line), which shows a
distance between practical and ideal cases. The practical
performance can be optimized using squeezed states with
higher squeeze factor [68].
What’s more, for given distances, we plot the secret
key rate vs. the block size when both ideal and practical
parameters are given (Fig. 4). The channel losses are
0.2 dB, 0.4 dB, and 0.5 dB respectively. When the block
length reduces, the secret key rate decreases rapidly and
one can not generate secret key when the block length is
smaller than 1010 under the practical parameters.
B. Reverse reconciliation protocol
Similar to the direct reconciliation case, the protocol’s
performance under reverse reconciliation can be illus-
trated using the same method. The smooth maximum
entropy is the same with that of the direct reconciliation
case, while the leakage information is different.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Secret key rates of squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol against coherent attack in the extremely
asymmetric case (TBC = 0) with reverse reconciliation. The
protocol is under ideal modulation variances VA = VB = 10
5
and perfect reconciliation efficiency β = 1. The block lengths
from left to right curves correspond to N = 1010 (green dot-
dashed line), 1011 (blue dot line), 1012 (red dashed line) and
∞ (black solid line), respectively. Here the discretization pa-
rameter is set to d = 13, the excess noise to ε1 = ε2 = 0.002,
and the overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Secret key rates of squeezed-state
CV-MDI QKD protocol against coherent attack in the ex-
tremely asymmetric case (TBC = 0) with reverse reconcil-
iation. The protocol is under practical modulation vari-
ances VA = VB = 5.04 and imperfect reconciliation efficiency
β = 96.9%. The block lengths from left to right curves are
N = 1010 (green dot-dashed line), 1011 (blue dot line), 1012
(red dashed line) and ∞ (black solid line), respectively. The
discretization parameter, excess noises, and security parame-
ters are chosen as in the case of ideal modulation.
Both ideal cases and practical cases are taken into con-
sideration and the parameters we choose are the same
with those of the direct reconciliation cases. Here large
variances VA = VB = 10
5 are chosen first to illustrate the
performance of ideal modulation (Fig. 5), then the prac-
tical variances VA = VB = 5.04 are exploited to show
the realistic performance (Fig. 6). N = 1010, N = 1011,
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Secret key rates vs block size for the
extremely asymmetric case (TBC = 0) with reverse recon-
ciliation. The solid lines are under the ideal condition that
modulation variances VA = VB = 10
5 and perfect recon-
ciliation efficiency β = 1. The dot-dashed lines are un-
der the practical condition that practical modulation vari-
ances VA = VB = 5.04 and imperfect reconciliation efficiency
β = 96.9%. From left to right, the transmittance of the quan-
tum channel corresponds to loss of 1 dB (black line), 2 dB
(red line), and 3 dB (green line), respectively.
N = 1012, and the asymptotic regime are considered here
as well. For a realistic performance of fiber loss 0.2
dB/km, the total loss can be up to 6.5 dB in the ideal
condition and 3.6 dB in the practical condition, corre-
sponding to 32.5 km and 18 km respectively. Hence the
reverse reconciliation cases could be feasible in metropoli-
tan range communications.
Figure 7 shows the relation between block size and se-
cret key rate in the extremely asymmetric circumstance.
It illustrates that it is in principle possible to generate
secret keys for block sizes of 107 − 1012 in reverse rec-
onciliation case, depending on channel losses and the re-
quired level of security, which is easier to achieve than
direct case.
In general, our numerical simulation results show that
the protocol can tolerate at most 2.5 dB channel loss
with direct reconciliation and 6.5 dB channel loss with
reverse reconciliation against coherent attacks in the ex-
tremely asymmetric scenario. Meanwhile, the secret key
rate is reduced considering practical squeezing parameter
and imperfect reconciliation efficiency. Finite-size effect
is also discussed apart from asymptotic regime. When
the block size is of the order of 107−1012, one can achieve
high secret key rates depending on the channel loss, thus
it is practical on the metropolitan scale with current tech-
nologies.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a composable security analy-
sis for squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD against general co-
9herent attacks. Its security analysis is derived based on
the entanglement-based scheme and a version of state-
independent entropic uncertainty relation is exploited
to give a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-
entropy by trusting Alice’s and Bob’s devices. Finite
size effect is also taken into consideration, and we use
two independent entangling cloner attacks to simulate
the performance of the method in both direct and reverse
reconciliation cases. The simulation results show that, in
extremely asymmetric scenarios, the protocol can toler-
ate 2.5 dB and 0.64 dB channel losses under ideal and
practical conditions with direct reconciliation, and 6.5
dB and 3.6 dB channel losses under ideal and practical
conditions with reverse reconciliation. An interesting ex-
tension to this paper would be to further add the energy
test to remove the trusted source assumption.
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Appendix A: Estimation of tq and tp in measurement
stage
The usage of tq and tp in Eq. (3) in the main text
is to ensure that the discreted data between Alice and
Bob have strong correlation after states passing through
channels. In order to guarantee the difference between
the data collected by Alice and Bob is small enough, one
possible solution is to rescale one of two communicated
parties’ data such that the second moments of Alice’s and
Bob’s amplitude and phase measurement match.
Supposing Alice and Bob randomly choose amplitude
strings {XA, XB} of lengthm and phase strings {PA, PB}
of length j to estimate parameter tq and tp respectively.
Here the estimation of tq is demonstrated as an example,
and that of tp can be calculated using the same method.
First, considering the scenario where there is no
rescaled and discretization processes in the measurement
phase, theoretically the average value of amplitude mea-
surement outcomes both in Alice’s and Bob’s sides can
be estimated by
Eˆ (QA) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
QiA, Eˆ (QB) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
QiB, (A1)
and the variance of amplitude measurement outcomes
both in Alice’s and Bob’s sides can be written as
σˆ (QA) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
QiA − Eˆ (QA)
)2
, (A2)
and
σˆ (QB) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
QiB − Eˆ (QB)
)2
. (A3)
After taking rescaled process into account, the estima-
tors of new date Q˜A should satisfy the following forms
Eˆ
(
Q˜A
)
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
Q˜iA, (A4)
σˆ
(
Q˜A
)
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Q˜iA − Eˆ
(
Q˜A
))2
. (A5)
In order to match the variances of Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement data, the values of Eq. (A3) and Eq. (A5)
should be the same. When discretization process is done,
the parameter tq can be estimated by
tq =
√√√√√√√
m∑
i=1
(
X iB − Eˆ (XB)
)2
m∑
i=1
(
X iA − Eˆ (XA)
)2 , (A6)
where Eˆ (·) is the estimator of the average value of mea-
sured data. Therefore, parameter tp can be written using
the same estimation method, which reads
tp =
√√√√√√√√
j∑
i=1
(
P iB − Eˆ (PB)
)2
j∑
i=1
(
P iA − Eˆ (PA)
)2 . (A7)
Appendix B: Derivation of covariance matrixes
Considering the EB version of the squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol, Eve’s attacks can be modeled by
two independent entangled-cloner attacks (shown in Fig.
8 and supposing modes E2 and E3 are independent for
simplification), where channelAC and channelBC are re-
placed by two BS with transmittances T1 and T2 respec-
tively. The covariance matrixes of two BS can be written
as
10
S
A(B)
BS =
( √
T1(2)
√
1− T1(2)
−√1− T1(2) √T1(2)
)
, (B1)
After passing two channels, mode A2 becomes A
′, and
mode B2 becomes B
′, and the following relationships of
quadratures hold
Aˆ′ =
√
T1Aˆ2 +
√
1− T1Eˆ2, (B2)
and
Bˆ′ =
√
T2Bˆ2 +
√
1− T2Eˆ3. (B3)
Then Charlie applies Bell detection of the measured
states. Modes A′ and B′ are combined with a balanced
beam splitter with output modes C and D. Therefore we
can get modes C and D as
ࡱࡼࡾ૚ ࡱࡼࡾ૛
Displacement
Alice Bob
Charlie
࡭૚
࡭૛ ࡮૚
࡮૛
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FIG. 8. (Color online) EB scheme of the squeezed-state CV-
MDI QKD protocol with Eve’s attacks. After two channels,
mode A2 becomes A
′, and mode B2 becomes B
′. QM is the
quantum memory.
Cˆ =
1√
2
(
Aˆ′ − Bˆ′
)
=
1√
2
(√
T1Aˆ2 −
√
T2Bˆ2
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− T1Eˆ2 −
√
1− T2Eˆ3
)
, (B4)
and
Dˆ =
1√
2
(
Aˆ′ + Bˆ′
)
=
1√
2
(√
T1Aˆ2 +
√
T2Bˆ2
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− T1Eˆ2 +
√
1− T2Eˆ3
)
. (B5)
Before Charlie makes a Bell measurement to the C and D modes, the whole state ρA1CDB1 can be described by
the 8× 8 covariance matrix γA1CDB1 , given by
γA1CDB1 =


VAI2
√
1
2T1 (V
2
A − 1)σz
√
1
2T1 (V
2
A − 1)σz 0I2√
1
2T1 (V
2
A − 1)σz
(
1
2T1 (VA + χ1) +
1
2T2 (VA + χ2)
)
I2
(
1
2T1 (VA + χ1)− 12T2 (VA + χ2)
)
I2
√
1
2T2 (V
2
B − 1)σz√
1
2T1 (V
2
A − 1)σz
(
1
2T1 (VA + χ1)− 12T2 (VA + χ2)
)
I2
(
1
2T1 (VA + χ1) +
1
2T2 (VA + χ2)
)
I2 −
√
1
2T2 (V
2
B − 1)σz
0I2
√
1
2T2 (V
2
B − 1)σz −
√
1
2T2 (V
2
B − 1)σz VBI2


, (B6)
where ε1 and ε2 in χ1 = 1/T1 − 1 + ε1, χ2 = 1/T2 − 1 + ε2 are the excess noises of the corresponding channels.
The measurement results xC and pD are announced by Charlie in a public channel so that Bob can displace mode
B1 to B
′
1, whose relationships of quadratures read
Bˆ′1x = Bˆ1x + gCˆx =
(
Bˆ1x − g
√
T2
2
Bˆ2x
)
+ g
√
T1
2
Aˆ2x +
g√
2
(√
1− T1Eˆ2x −
√
1− T2Eˆ3x
)
, (B7)
and
Bˆ′1p = Bˆ1p + gDˆp =
(
Bˆ1p + g
√
T2
2
Bˆ2p
)
+ g
√
T1
2
Aˆ2p +
g√
2
(√
1− T1Eˆ2p +
√
1− T2Eˆ3p
)
. (B8)
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Hence the covariance matrix γA1B1′ of the state ρA1B1′ can be written as Eq. (16) in the main text.
Appendix C: Derivation of discrete Shannon entropy
A continuous variable can always be approximated as a
discrete variable with finite resolution digital discretiza-
tion, and the smaller the discreted unit is, the closer the
discrete variable is to the continuous variable.
Assuming that the variable x belongs to the interval
x ∈ [a, b], whose probability density function is denoted
by p (x), we divide this interval into n continuous in-
tervals with same length δ, where δ = b−a
n
. Accord-
ing to the mean value theorem of integrals, there is a
value xi in each interval xi ∈ [a+ (i− 1) δ, a+ iδ], where
i = 1, 2, ...n, and xi should satisfy
pi = p (xi) δ =
∫ a+iδ
a+(i−1)δ
p (x) dx, (C1)
where pi is the probability in each intervals. Therefore,
the discrete Shannon entropy H
(
xδ
)
can be derived by
H
(
xδ
)
= −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi
= −
n∑
i=1
p (xi) δ log [p (xi) δ]
= −
n∑
i=1
p (xi) δ log p (xi)− (log δ)
n∑
i=1
p (xi) δ
= −
n∑
i=1
p (xi) δ log p (xi)− log δ. (C2)
Here we use the relation
n∑
i=1
p (xi)δ = 1. The limit of
H
(
xδ
)
as δ approaches zero, goes toward the entropy of
continuous variable, which reads
lim
δ→0
Hn
(
xδ
)
= lim
δ→0
[
−
n∑
i=1
pn (xi) δ log pn (xi)− log δ
]
= −
b∫
a
p (x) log p (x) dx− lim
δ→0
(log δ)
∆
= h (x) +H (δ) , (C3)
where h (x) = −
b∫
a
p (x) log p (x) dx denotes the differen-
tial entropy, and H (δ) = − lim
δ→0
(log δ).
Now consider a normal distribution
g (x) =
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
, (C4)
with variance σ2. The differential entropy of a normal
distribution reads,
h (x) = −
∫
g (x) log [g (x)]
= −
∫
dxg (x)
(
− x
2
2σ2
+
1
2
log
(
2πσ2
))
=
1
2
+
1
2
log
(
2πσ2
)
= log
(√
2πeσ2
)
. (C5)
Supposing another continuous variable y ∈ [a, b], the
relationships
∫
p (y) dy = 1 and
∫
p (x/y) dx = 1 hold,
where p (x/y) is the conditional probability density func-
tion of x given y. Then
H
(
xδ
/
yδ
)
= −
∑
j
p (yj) δ
∑
i
p (xi/yj) δ log [p (xi/yj) δ]
= −
∑
j
p (yj) δ
∑
i
p (xi/yj) δ log [p (xi/yj)]− log δ,
(C6)
and the limit of H
(
xδ
/
yδ
)
as δ approaches zero reads
lim
δ→0
H
(
xδ
/
yδ
)
= h (x/y) +H (δ) , (C7)
where h (x/y) is the conditional entropy of x given y,
which reads
h (x/y) = −
∫ ∫
p (y) p (x/y) log p (x/y)dxdy. (C8)
Hence the mutual information I
(
xδ : yδ
)
between dis-
crete variables xδ and yδ, as approaches zero, can be
approximated,
lim
δ→0
I
(
xδ : yδ
)
= lim
δ→0
[
H
(
xδ
)−H (xδ/yδ)]
= h (x)− log δ − (h (x/y)− log δ)
= I (x : y) , (C9)
where I (x : y) is the mutual information between con-
tinuous variables x and y. Therefore, if the length of
intervals δ is small enough, we can always regard the
continuous variable mutual information I (x : y) as the
12
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Comparison of the secret key between
independent entangling cloner attacks model and correlated
modes attacks model in symmetric case. The ideal case is
under ideal modulation variances VA = VB = 10
5 and per-
fect reconciliation efficiency β = 1. The practical case is with
practical modulation variances VA = VB = 5.04 and imper-
fect reconciliation efficiency β = 96.9%. The solid lines are
the secret key rates under two independent entangling cloner
attacks model. The dashed lines are the secret key rates under
two correlated modes attacks model.
approximation of the discrete one.
Appendix D: Symmetric cases under two correlated
modes attacks and the comparison with the PLOB
bound
In the main text, the performance of squeezed-state
CV-MDI QKD under coherent attacks has been discussed
focusing on the extremely asymmetric cases (TBC = 0).
However, in the calculation of security key rate, all of
effects caused by the channel are usually treated as Eve’s
contribution. The optimal attack strategy provide the
maximum information for Eve to reduce the security of
the protocol to the greatest extent, so it is important to
study the protocol under more general attack strategies.
According to Ref. [67], the covariance matrix of two
correlated modes E2 and E3 measured by Eve (Fig. 8)
has the following form:
γE2E3 =
(
VE2I2 G
G VE3I2
)
, (D1)
where G is the correlation term. Supposing VE2 =
VE3 = VE , to achieve maximum correlation between
Eve’s modes, G is chosen as
√
V 2E − 1σz due to the uncer-
tainty principle, and the final covariance matrix of ρA1B1′
under two correlated mode attack model is given by
γA1B1′ =
(
VAI2
√
T (V 2A − 1)σz√
T (V 2A − 1)σz [T (VA − 1) + 1 + Te′] I2
)
.
(D2)
The equivalent excess noise e′ reads
e′ = 1 +
1
T1
[2 + T2 (ε2 − 2) + T1 (ε1 − 1)− CE ]
+
1
T1
(√
2
g
√
VB − 1−
√
T2
√
VB + 1
)2
, (D3)
where CE =
2
T1
√
(1− T1) (1− T2) 〈E2xE3x〉 is
the noise contribution of x-quadrature induced
by the correlation of Eve’s two modes, and
CE = − 2T1
√
(1− T1) (1− T2) 〈E2pE3p〉 is the corre-
sponding noise contribution of p-quadrature.
If one of T1 and T2 is equal to zero, corresponding to
the extremely asymmetric case (discussed in our main
text), the contribution of the two modes’ correlation in
Eve’s attack disappears, and the independent entangling
cloner attack and two correlated mode attack are equiv-
alent in this situation. Therefore, the model of two in-
dependent entangling cloner attack can simplify our nu-
merical simulation in the main text.
Under correlated mode attacks, the secret key rate for-
mula is the same as that in the main text (Eq. 10), but
compared with independent entangling cloner attacks,
the cases that both T1 and T2 are not equal to zero will
increase the leakage information and then decrease the
key rate in the two correlated mode attack model. Typ-
ically, in the symmetric case, where the relay is located
in the middle of Alice and Bob, we compare the results
between two independent entangling cloner attacks and
the two correlated modes attacks in Fig. 9, and the dis-
cussion is under the asymptotic regime.
It can be seen that in the symmetric case, which is the
worst case for the two correlated modes attacks (because
the correlation term CE reaches the maximum value),
this correlated attack model will slightly degrade the per-
formance of the protocol. Moreover, the more asymmet-
ric the protocol, the smaller the impact of the correlated
attack on the secret key rate.
In experiment, the covariance matrices can be obtained
by data statistics, so there is no need to assume which
model Eve’s attack strategy belongs to before the proto-
col starts. If Eve’s attack is stronger than the model we
give in our simulation, the correlation between Alice and
Bob’s data will decline, so the estimation of max-entropy
will increase, causing the decrease of the min-entropy.
Moreover, Alice and Bob need to sacrifice more keys to
do the error correction in classical post-processing pro-
cess, and it will leak more information to Eve. Therefore,
if the two correlated mode attack is exploited by Eve, the
secret key rate can still be calculated using Eq. 10 and
it will not influence the security analysis of the protocol,
13
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Comparison of the secret key between
the extremely asymmetric results and the PLOB bound. Our
protocol is under ideal modulation variances VA = VB = 10
5
and perfect reconciliation efficiency β = 1. The red solid line
is the bound of secret key capacity of asymmetric CV-MDI-
QKD. The green dot-dashed line and the blue dashed line are
the secret key rates of CV-MDI-QKD with squeezed states in
direct and reverse reconciliation cases respectively.
but the secret key rate will decrease.
We also compare the extremely asymmetric results
with the PLOB bound [69] shown in Fig. 10, which is
the secret-key capacity of the lossy channel. It can be
seen that even though there is still a gap between the se-
cret key rate of our protocol and the key capacity bound
above, the final key rate can be improved using current
technologies, such as photon subtraction method [70–72]
and adding trusted noise method [43, 73].
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